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This article provides an overview of a probabilistic constraints framework for
thinking about language acquisition and processing. The generative ap-
proach attempts to characterize knowledge of language (i.e., competence
grammar) and then asks how this knowledge is acquired and used. Our
approach is performance oriented: the goal is to explain how people com-
prehend and produce utterances and how children acquire this skill. Use of
language involves exploiting multiple probabilistic constraints over various
types of linguistic and nonlinguistic information. Acquisition is the process
of accumulating this information, which begins in infancy. The constraint
satisfaction processes that are central to language use are the same as the
bootstrapping processes that provide entry to language for the child. Fram-
ing questions about acquisition in terms of models of adult performance
uni®es the two topics under a set of common principles and has important
consequences for arguments concerning language learnability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Issues about acquisition have played a central role in the generative approach to language.
That language involves innate, domain-speciﬁc types of knowledge is taken as one of the
major ﬁndings to have emerged from the generative framework (Lightfoot, 1982). The
“poverty of the stimulus” argument (Chomsky, 1965, 1986) is a cornerstone of the
approach; for many years it has guided researchers toward certain types of explanations
for how language is acquired (e.g., Universal Grammar) and away from others (e.g.,
learning). Over the past few years, an alternative approach to language acquisition has
begun to emerge as an outgrowth of several developments outside of the linguistic
mainstream. The sources for this new approach include the renewed interest in the
statistical and probabilistic aspects of language on the part of many language researchers;
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569the connectionist approach to knowledge representation, learning, and processing; and
research on learning in infants and young children. We will call this the “probabilistic
constraints” approach, because its central idea is that acquisition and processing involve
the use of multiple, simultaneous, probabilistic constraints deﬁned over different types of
linguistic and nonlinguistic information. This article will provide an overview of the
approach, focusing on the relationship between acquisition and processing. Instead of
asking how the child acquires competence grammar, we view acquisition in terms of how
the child converges on adult-like performance in comprehending and producing utter-
ances. This performance orientation changes the picture considerably with respect to
classic issues about language learnability and provides a uniﬁed approach to studying
acquisition and processing.
1
II. GENERATIVE GRAMMAR AND PROBABILISTIC CONSTRAINTS
The questions that have been the focus of modern research on language are what is
knowledge of a language, how is this knowledge acquired, and how is this knowledge
used in comprehension and production (Chomsky, 1986).
2 The generative paradigm
entails assumptions about how to ﬁnd the answers to these questions and provides
provisional answers to them (see Lightfoot, 1982, Atkinson, 1992 for reviews):
c Knowing a language involves knowing a grammar–a domain-speciﬁc form of knowl-
edge representation that permits the creation of a nearly inﬁnite set of well-formed
utterances. The grammar speciﬁes how language is structured at different levels of
representation and provides a basis for distinguishing well-formed from ill-formed
sentences.
c The grammar is a characterization of the knowledge of an idealized speaker-hearer.
This “competence” assumption means that grammatical theory abstracts away from
many of the factors that govern language use, including memory limitations, individ-
ual differences, facts about the computational system that implements the grammar,
and so on.
c Poverty of the stimulus arguments suggest that this knowledge cannot be derived
solely or even largely from experience. The input is impoverished insofar as children’s
knowledge of language eventually extends far beyond the range of utterances to which
they are exposed; the input is overly rich insofar as it affords incorrect inductive
generalizations that children never make; hence the input cannot be the source of core
grammatical knowledge. Results from Gold (1967) and others suggest that grammar
identiﬁcation cannot be achieved unless there are strong constraints on the possible
forms of grammatical knowledge.
c The view that children are born with knowledge of Universal Grammar is compatible
with the results of behavioral studies indicating that various types of knowledge (e.g.,
empty categories; the binding principles) are present in children as young as they can
be tested. It is also compatible with the observation that languages exhibit structures
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review of both claims).
c This view will simultaneously account for facts about linguistic universals and it is
compatible with other converging evidence (concerning, e.g., creolization; language
acquisition under atypical circumstances; see Bickerton, 1984, and Landau & Gleit-
man, 1985, respectively).
III. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK
The probabilistic constraints framework provides an alternative perspective on all of these
issues.
An Alternative To Grammar
In the approach that we are advocating, knowing a language is not equated with knowing
a grammar. Rather, we adopt the functionalist assumption knowledge of language as
something that develops in the course of learning how to perform the primary commu-
nicative tasks of comprehension and production (see, e.g., Bates & MacWhinney, 1982).
As a ﬁrst approximation we view this knowledge as a neural network that maps between
form and meaning and vice versa. Other levels of linguistic representation (e.g., syntax,
morphology) are thought to be emergent structures that the network develops in the course
of learning to perform these tasks. Allen and Seidenberg (1999) provide an illustration of
this approach (for related studies, see Christiansen & Chater, 1999; Elman, 1990). They
implemented an attractor network that was trained on two tasks: it was given a sequence
of words as input and had to compute the words’ semantics (“comprehension”) or it was
given semantic patterns as input and had to compute a sequence of words (“production”).
The network was trained on sentences that exhibited a fairly broad range of syntactic
structures; these sentences were based on ones that had been used by Linebarger,
Schwartz, and Saffran (1983) in a classic study of aphasic language. The model was
trained on 10 examples of each of 10 sentence types using a vocabulary of 97 words. It
was then tested on novel examples of these structures using the same words. Allen and
Seidenberg show that the model generalized to these novel forms quite accurately.
Even though this network’s coverage of the grammar of English is quite limited, it
serves to illustrate several components of the probabilistic constraints approach. The
network developed a representation of (some aspects of) the structure of English in the
course learning to produce and comprehend utterances, on the basis of exposure to
well-formed examples. The representation of this knowledge—by the weights on con-
nections between units—is not a grammar; it does not have the form of rewrite rules or
constraints on tree structures that are seen in standard symbolic grammars or compute the
same types of representations. Moreover, it encodes statistical aspects of the input that are
excluded from standard generative grammars, information that on our view plays critical
roles in language acquisition and use.
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task that assumes considerable importance because it has provided the main data for
constructing grammatical theories. Allen and Seidenberg’s (1999) model illustrates how
this task can be construed within our framework. As part of their assessment of the
model’s capacity to generalize, Allen and Seidenberg tested it on novel grammatical and
ungrammatical sentences such as “He came to my house at noon” and “He came my house
at noon,” respectively. The model performed qualitatively differently on these types of
sentences, computing the semantic representations for words less accurately in ungram-
matical ones. Allen and Seidenberg also report the results of testing the model on
sentences that are comparable to Chomsky’s classic “Colorless green ideas sleep furious-
ly.” The network’s responses to such sentences patterned more closely with performance
on other grammatical sentences than with ungrammatical ones.
3 Thus, within the limited
fragment of English grammar on which the model was trained, it treated “grammatical”
and “ungrammatical” sentences differently. These differences provide a basis for labelling
sentences as well- or ill-formed even though the network itself is not a grammar.
An Alternative To “Competence”
Our approach does not share the competence orientation that is central to generative
linguistics. We think that the competence-performance distinction encourages disregard-
ing data that are actually essential to understanding basic characteristics of language. The
competence approach uncontroversially excludes performance mishaps such as false
starts, hesitations, and errors from the characterization of linguistic knowledge. However,
it also excludes aspects of linguistic performance that are more central to the structure of
utterances. It is assumed, for example, that language should be characterized indepen-
dently of the perceptual and motor systems employed in language use; memory capacities
that limit the complexity of utterances that can be produced or understood; and reasoning
capacities used in comprehending text or discourse. Following the “Colorless green ideas
sleep furiously” example, the competence theory also systematically excludes information
about statistical and probabilistic aspects of language. How often particular structures are
used and in what combinations are not seen as relevant to characterizing the essential
nature of language.
It is clear from recent studies, however, that these aspects of language play enormously
important roles in acquisition and processing (see, for example, MacDonald, Pearlmutter,
& Seidenberg, 1994; Tanenhaus & Trueswell, 1995; Kelly, 1992; Saffran, Newport, &
Aslin, 1996; Morgan & Demuth, 1996). The apparent complexity of language and its
uniqueness vis a ´ vis other aspects of cognition, which are taken as major discoveries of
the standard approach, may derive in part from the fact that these “performance” factors
are not available to enter into explanations of linguistic structure. Partitioning language
into competence and performance and then treating the latter as a separate issue for
psycholinguists to ﬁgure out has the effect of excluding many aspects of language
structure and use from the data on which the competence theory is developed. What is left
as a basis for characterizing language are the various abstract, domain speciﬁc, theory-
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ask how a grammar of this sort could be acquired. Given this approach to theory
construction, it is not surprising that the resulting characterization of linguistic knowledge
seems only remotely related to the child’s experience.
The competence approach also promotes systematic overattributions about the nature
of linguistic knowledge. It is well known that competence grammar is overly powerful
relative to people’s actual capacities to comprehend and produce utterances. The classic
example is that the grammar permits unlimited amounts of center-embedding, as in the
examples in (1). People’s capacities to comprehend or produce such structures are quite
limited: Only a single embedding (1a) is easily processed, and multiple levels of embed-
ding are difﬁcult or impossible to comprehend or produce.
1a. The cat [that the dog chased] is now sitting on the window sill.
1b. The cat that [the dog [that the girl bought] chased] is now sitting on the window sill.
1c. The cat that [the dog [that the girl [who Willard loves] bought] chased] is now sitting
on the windowsill.
How to address the discrepancy between what the grammar allows and what people can
comprehend or produce has been an issue since the earliest days of generative grammar
(Chomsky, 1957). The standard solution is to allow such structures to be generated by the
grammar but introduce extrinsic “performance constraints” to account for the difﬁculty of
(1b–c) (see Gibson, 1998, for a recent example). Our approach is different: We are
attempting to characterize a performance system that handles all and only those structures
that people can. Performance constraints are embodied in the system responsible for
producing and comprehending utterances, not extrinsic to it (MacDonald & Christiansen,
1999; Christiansen & Chater, 1999). This approach obviates the paradox created by a
characterization of linguistic knowledge that generates sentences that people neither
produce nor comprehend.
The fact that we are trying to account for peoples’ attested capacities rather than the
ones assumed by the competence approach is important. Our methodology involves
implementing connectionist models that simulate detailed aspects of performance. In the
past, some of the criticism of such models has focused on whether they can capture one
or another aspect of grammatical competence, characterized in the usual idealized manner
(e.g., Fodor & Pylyshyn, 1988). However, the appropriate way to assess our models is in
terms peoples’ performance, not the idealized characterization of linguistic knowledge
that is competence grammar.
An Alternative to Grammar Identiﬁcation
The probabilistic constraints approach also differs from generative grammar with regard
to how the task confronting the language learner is characterized. The generative approach
assumes that the task is grammar identiﬁcation: the child has to converge on the
knowledge structures that constitute the grammar. Questions about acquisition are framed
in terms of problems in acquiring grammar, e.g., how the child could set parameters of the
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overgeneralizations in the absence of negative evidence. The alternative view is that the
task the child is engaged in is learning to use language (see Seidenberg, 1997; see Bates
& MacWhinney, 1982, for an earlier statement of this view). In the course of mastering
this task, children develop various types of knowledge representations. The primary
function of this knowledge is producing and comprehending utterances. A derived
function is allowing the child to distinguish grammatical from ungrammatical sentences.
Consider the analogous problem of learning to read. The beginning reader must learn
to recognize printed words; there are detailed theories of how this skill is acquired (e.g.,
Seidenberg & McClelland, 1989; Harm & Seidenberg, 1999). Once acquired, this knowl-
edge can be used to perform many other tasks. One task that has been studied in scores
of experiments is “lexical decision,” which is judging whether a string of letters is a word
or not. Even young readers can reliably determine that book is a word but NUST is not.
Note, however, that the task confronting the beginning reader is not acquiring the capacity
to make lexical decisions. By the same token, the task confronting the language learner is
not acquiring the knowledge that supports making grammaticality judgments. In both
cases, knowledge that is acquired for other purposes can eventually be used to perform
these secondary tasks. Such tasks provide a useful way of assessing peoples’ knowledge;
however, it would be a mistake to deﬁne the acquisition problem in terms of the capacity
to make such judgments.
This change in orientation from grammar identiﬁcation to learning to use language has
important consequences for standard poverty of the stimulus arguments. There is not
sufﬁcient space in this article to review all of the forms of argument and types of evidence
that have been taken as evidence for the innateness of grammar. In brief, it turns out that
many of the classic arguments rest on the assumption that the child’s task is grammar
identiﬁcation, and these arguments simply no longer apply if the task is instead acquiring
the performance system underlying comprehension and production. For example, the fact
that the input contains both grammatical and ungrammatical utterances that are not labeled
as such is far more relevant to grammar identiﬁcation than it is to learning to comprehend
and produce utterances. Given that the target is no longer construed as a grammar, our
approach does not entail the assumptions that underlie the analyses of learnability by Gold
(1967) and others. Other classic arguments concern how the child copes with noisy or
variable input, issues for which connectionist learning principles provide a potential
solution. One of the important properties of the algorithms used in training such models
is their capacity to derive structural regularities from noisy or variable input. Similarly, the
claim that “negative facts cannot be learned” (Crain, 1991) is contradicted by the behavior
of even very simple networks such as the Allen and Seidenberg model described earlier.
The network is trained on the basis of exposure to examples. Adjustments to the weights
in response to these attested forms simultaneously provide evidence against structures that
have not been observed because they do not occur in the language (e.g., because they are
ungrammatical). The network nonetheless supports generalization because novel gram-
matical sentences share structure with previously encountered sentences. Thus, the Allen
and Seidenberg (1999) model treated ungrammatical sentences such as “John came my
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time it was exposed to them.
Evidence from Studies of Young Children
Two aspects of children’s performance have been taken as particularly strong evidence for
the innateness of grammatical principles. One is that children exhibit sensitivity to
grammatical constraints at the youngest ages at which they can be tested. The other is that
children show sensitivity to structures for which there is no evidence in the input (see
Crain, 1991, for summaries of both arguments). With our change in theoretical orientation
there is a need to re-examine these kinds of arguments. The validity of both claims
depends on the theory of what is being learned (i.e., the target) and the theory of how
children learn. The notion of what constitutes important evidence for learning a particular
structure is not theory-neutral. Poverty of the stimulus arguments have been developed
within a framework in which the target was grammar and the learning mechanism
involved testing hypotheses about grammatical rules. Because these arguments have been
very persuasive, research on language acquisition within the generative tradition has not
examined relevant aspects of children’s learning capacities very closely.
We have already suggested that our approach entails a different perspective on the
nature of the target: The characterization of the target changes if we abandon the
assumption that it is a grammar and various performance factors are permitted to enter into
explanations of linguistic structure. Our approach also entails a different account of
children’s learning. Rather than involving hypothesis testing about grammatical rules,
learning involves accumulating information about statistical and probabilistic aspects of
language. We now know that learning about these aspects of language is very robust and
begins at a very early age. For example, Saffran et al. (1996) demonstrated such learning
in 8-month-olds. Other studies suggest that this kind of learning begins in utero: Newborns
already show a preference for listening to speech in their mother’s language (Moon,
Panneton–Cooper, & Fifer, 1993). Results such as these raise questions about the extent
to which children could have learned various aspects of language by the time they reach
the age at which experimenters are able to test them (in studies such as Crain’s, around
2.6–3.0-years-old). Claims about what cannot be learned by the child need to be assessed
in terms of the kinds of statistical information available to the child and learning
mechanisms that are able to extract non-obvious regularities from it.
In pointing out the potentially important role for statistical learning in language
acquisition, we do not mean to assert that claims about the innateness of all aspects of
linguistic knowledge are necessarily wrong. Our assertion is only that the probabilistic
constraints framework provides strong motivation for re-examining claims about acqui-
sition that are taken as givens within the generative approach. The same holds for other
sorts of converging evidence thought to support the conclusion that grammar is innate.
Linguistic universals, for example, are standardly explained by placing universal grammar
in the brain of the child. However, there are other sources of constraint on the forms of
languages that need to be considered. Languages may exhibit the properties they do
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memory capacities), could not be learned (given the nature of human learning), would not
fulﬁll particular communicative functions, or would not have evolved in the species.
Together these considerations suggest a need to re-examine the both the nature of the
biological endowment relevant to language and the evidence for it (see also Elman, Bates,
Johnson, Karmiloff-Smith, Parisi & Plunkett, 1997, who reach similar conclusions).
IV. CONTINUITY BETWEEN ACQUISITION AND PROCESSING
In the generative approach, the target for the acquisition process is competence grammar,
the idealized characterization of linguistic knowledge. In our approach, the target is
provided by adult performance. Skilled users of language possess knowledge of how to
comprehend and produce language, not just constraints on the well-formedness of utter-
ances. The probabilistic constraints approach emphasizes the essential continuity between
acquisition and processing, and the goal is to develop an integrated theory in which the
same principles apply to both. This view suggests that it will be important for acquisition
researchers to understand the nature of the adult processing system in order to understand
how the child converges on it (Trueswell, Sekerina, Hill & Logrip, in press, provides an
excellent example). Similarly, research on adult performance should beneﬁt from an
understanding of the acquisition process, particularly how constraints on learning shape
the nature of the adult system. The observation that there is continuity between acquisition
and processing may seem obvious, but in fact the generative approach has tended to treat
the issues separately and to explain them by different principles. Acquisition is explained
in terms of concepts such as the “maturation” of grammar (Wexler, 1990) or the setting
of grammatical parameters (Lightfoot, 1991), whereas processing is explained in terms of
a “parser” endowed with heuristics to aid ambiguity resolution (e.g., Frazier, 1987). This
division is also seen in the interpretation of empirical results. Whereas accuracy on a task
such as pointing to a picture that matches an auditory sentence is typically thought to
reﬂect grammar development in the child, the identical task, when performed by adults,
is generally taken as reﬂecting performance mechanisms rather than grammatical com-
petence.
We do not have a comprehensive theory of all aspects of adult performance in hand,
but a picture of the general character of the system is provided by recent constraint-based
theories of adult language comprehension (MacDonald et al., 1994; Tanenhaus & Trues-
well, 1995). The essential idea of the constraint-based approach is that comprehending or
producing an utterance involves interactions among a large number of probabilistic
constraints over different types of linguistic and non-linguistic information.
4 In much of
this work, knowledge of language is represented in terms of a complex lexical network.
MacDonald et al. (1994) review arguments for an enriched conception of the lexicon in
which it encodes not merely the spellings, sounds, and meanings of words, but also
information such as the argument structures associated with verbs. This view of the
lexicon is broadly consistent with developments in syntactic theory, in which the lexicon
has also assumed increasing importance. However, the use of a network representation
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types of information as well as higher-order statistics concerning combinations of ele-
ments. The representation that the network computes in comprehending a sentence is that
which best satisﬁes the constraints of the language, which are encoded by the weights on
connections between units. Comprehensive computational models are not yet available,
but a number of researchers have developed simulations that implement small parts of the
system (McRae, Spivey–Knowlton & Tanenhaus, 1998; Pearlmutter, Daugherty, Mac-
Donald & Seidenberg, 1994; Tabor & Tanenhaus, this issue; Elman, 1990; Kim, Banga-
lore, & Trueswell, in press). In an interesting parallel development, recent work in
computational linguistics has emphasized the importance of probabilistic lexical informa-
tion in the construction of machine parsers (e.g., Charniak, 1997; Collins & Brooks,
1995). Although these parsers differ in fundamental ways from the kind of parallel
constraint satisfaction networks that we take as the model for the human sentence
processor, the shared interest in the role of probabilistic lexical constraints on the part of
researchers holding very different theoretical orientations underscores the importance of
this type of information.
To illustrate the general character of the constraint based approach, we will focus here
on a few important aspects of it that are particularly relevant to acquisition. First, a
network of this sort is both a representation of linguistic knowledge and a processing
mechanism. As in other connectionist models, there is no strong distinction between the
two. As a result, “performance constraints” (e.g., limits on the complexity of sentences
that can be processed) are encoded by the same machinery as knowledge of language
itself. This situation contrasts with other approaches in which knowledge of the language
(grammar) is represented separately from the performance systems that make use of this
knowledge (e.g., the parser, working memory). Second, the constraints that the model
encodes are probabilistic rather than absolute. For example, a noun phrase (NP) at the start
of a sentence is typically the agent of the action speciﬁed by the verb, but not always.
Third, the interactions among constraints are nonlinear. Types of information that are not
very constraining in isolation becomes highly constraining when considered together. For
example, the probability that a sentence-initial NP is an agent goes up substantially if the
NP is animate. Fourth, the levels of linguistic representation over which these computa-
tions occur are thought to emerge in the course of acquisition. For example, we think of
morphological structure as an interlevel representation that emerges in a multilayer
connectionist network that is computing relations among semantics, phonology, and the
contexts in which words occur. Similarly, grammatical categories derive from several
sources of correlated information, including meanings, phonological structure, and syn-
tactic context (Kelly, 1992; Mintz, Newport, & Bever, 1998; Redington, Chater & Finch,
1998; Schuetze, 1997).
These principles have been explored in a number of recent studies of syntactic
ambiguity resolution during language comprehension (see MacDonald et al., 1994, for
review). Much of this research has focused on how semantic and syntactic properties of
individual verbs affect the production and comprehension of syntactic structure. A simple
example concerns the interpretation of prepositional phrases (PPs) in sentences such as
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interpreted as modifying either the verb, such that it is an instrument of seeing, or the
direct object NP, such that the spy saw the cop who had the binoculars rather than some
other cop. This ambiguity is syntactic because the uncertainty of interpretation focuses not
on the individual words but rather on the relationships between phrases, namely whether
the phrase with the binoculars modiﬁes a noun or verb.
Traditional accounts of syntactic ambiguity resolution have assumed that the fact that
language comprehension is essentially immediate is incompatible with the use of multiple
probabilistic constraints, which were thought to be too weak or not available early enough
in processing to yield useful information. Instead, an initial interpretation of an ambiguity
was thought to be computed based on a single metric, such as the complexity (e.g., Frazier,
1987) or frequency (Mitchell, Cuetos, Corley, & Brysbaert, 1995) of the alternative
structures. These simple decision processes predict that people’s initial interpretations of
the PP ambiguity will frequently be wrong, as corpus data suggest that about 60% of the
PPs modify the direct object NP, and the remaining 40% modify the verb (Hindle &
Rooth, 1993; Collins & Brooks, 1995). Thus any simple structural metric will make errors
in the initial interpretation of this ambiguity on the order of 40% of the time at best, and
the Minimal Attachment metric favored by the best known structural account, the Garden
Path model (Frazier, 1987), initially chooses the verb attachment and therefore makes
about 60% errors. It is hard to reconcile these predictions with the observation that
comprehenders resolve this ambiguity quite easily. It is also hard to understand why the
human sentence processing mechanism would have converged on so inefﬁcient a strategy.
Research within the constraint-based approach suggests that comprehenders avoid
making errors 40–60% of the time by using other information that sentences provide. For
example, many prepositions do not modify nouns and verbs with equal frequency (e.g. of
almost exclusively modiﬁes noun phrases, as in glass of wine, president of the company),
and Collins and Brooks (1995) report that choosing the verb vs. noun attachment based
solely on the frequency bias of the preposition will resolve the ambiguity correctly about
72% of the time. This is substantially better than the accuracy of any purely structural
decision, and when several of these probabilistic lexical constraints are combined, the
ambiguity resolution problem narrows greatly. Some other key lexical information comes
from the verb in the sentence. Action verbs, which typically co-occur with a PP expressing
the instrument or manner of the action (e.g., cut with a knife, ate in a hurry) promote the
interpretation in which the PP modiﬁes the verb, whereas perception verbs (see, hear, etc.)
are not typically modiﬁed with manners or instruments, and they promote the noun-
modiﬁcation interpretation of the PP (Spivey–Knowlton & Sedivy, 1994; Taraban &
McClelland, 1988). Spivey–Knowlton and Sedivy showed that an additional, weaker
constraint is provided by the direct object NP: Indeﬁnite NPs (e.g. a dog) promote the
noun-modiﬁcation interpretation of the PP, whereas deﬁnite NPs (the dog) promote the
verb-modiﬁcation interpretation. The verb and noun constraints combine in a nonlinear
manner: the weaker noun deﬁniteness constraint has little effect when a verb strongly
promotes the verb-modiﬁcation interpretation, but its effects can be clearly seen when the
verb is one of perception. Finally, information from the surrounding discourse context also
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information is needed about the direct object NP (as when several cops were previously
mentioned so that The spy saw the cop. . . does not pick out a unique referent in the
discourse), then the noun-modiﬁcation interpretation is promoted (Altmann & Steedman,
1988). Thus the system is one that is strongly guided by verb- and preposition-based
constraints, which are in turn modulated by constraints from other lexical items and from
the broader discourse context.
Other syntactic ambiguities have been shown to have a similar character. For example,
the Main Verb/Reduced Relative ambiguity, which has a strong asymmetry in the
frequencies of its alternative interpretations, is shown in (2).
2a. Temporary Main Verb/Reduced Relative Ambiguity: The three men arrested. . .
2b. Main Verb Interpretation: The three men arrested the fugitives who had escaped
from the county jail.
2c. Reduced Relative Interpretation: The three men arrested in the parking lot had just
escaped from the county jail.
The ambiguity centers on the role of an ambiguous verb, in this case arrested.I no n e
interpretation, shown in (2b), arrested is the main verb of the sentence, and the preceding
NP (The three men) is the agent of the action. In (2c), however, this NP is the patient of
the action, and the verb arrested introduces a passive relative clause (called a “reduced”
relative because the optional words who were are omitted from the start of the relative
clause). A number of researchers have observed that interpretation of this ambiguity is
strongly constrained by the frequency with which the ambiguous verb occurs in transitive
and passive structures, of which reduced relative clauses are a special type (MacDonald,
1994; MacDonald et al., 1994; Trueswell, 1996). Interpretation of this structure is also
constrained by combinatorial lexical information, such as the plausibility of the prenomi-
nal noun phrase (e.g. The three men in [2]) ﬁlling the agent or patient role of the verb
(MacDonald, 1994; McRae, Spivey–Knowlton, & Tanenhaus, in press; Pearlmutter &
MacDonald, 1992; Tabossi, Spivey–Knowlton, McRae & Tanenhaus, 1994; Trueswell,
Tanenhaus & Garnsey, 1994). Additional constraints are provided by discourse context
(Spivey–Knowlton, Trueswell, & Tanenhaus, 1993; Trueswell & Tanenhaus, 1991; Alt-
mann & Steedman, 1988). Again, combination of constraints is nonlinear in that manip-
ulations of noun agency or discourse context can successfully promote the rarer reduced
relative interpretation only when properties of the ambiguous verb make this interpretation
a viable one (MacDonald et al., 1994).
The picture that emerges from these and other studies of adult language comprehension
is that adults have a vast amount of statistical information about the behavior of lexical
items in their language, and that at least for English, verbs provide some of the strongest
constraints on the resolution of syntactic ambiguities. Comprehenders know the relative
frequencies with which individual verbs appear in different tenses, in active vs. passive
structures, and in intransitive versus transitive structures, the typical kinds of subjects and
objects that a verb takes, and many other such facts. This information is acquired through
experience with input that exhibits these distributional properties. A verb’s behavior is
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of the essence of the verb arrested includes the fact that it is frequently used in passive
contexts in which the person arrested is the subject of the sentence. In our approach, this
information is not some idiosyncratic fact in the lexicon isolated from “core” grammatical
information; rather, it is relevant at all stages of lexical, syntactic and discourse compre-
hension.
“Bootstrapping” versus “Constraint Satisfaction”
Given this view of the adult system, one of the central questions in acquisition concerns
how knowledge of probabilistic constraints is acquired. In fact, there is a signiﬁcant body
of acquisition research relevant to this question: studies of children’s acquisition of verbs.
This research (e.g., Gleitman, 1990; Pinker, 1989) has not been framed in terms of adult
performance or connectionist models but in fact it quite compatible with our approach; a
recent paper by Gillette, Gleitman, Gleitman, & Lederer (1998) makes the connection
between this acquisition research and constraint satisfaction mechanisms explicit. Chil-
dren learning English eventually come to know both the meanings of verbs and a complex
set of conditions governing their occurrence in sentence structures (in some theories these
are termed conditions on subcategorization). Consider for example some differences
among the three common, semantically related verbs LOAD, POUR, and FILL. LOAD
can appear in both of the locative constructions given in (3–4). POUR and FILL, in
contrast, are each limited to one of the alternatives (5–8).
3. I loaded the bricks onto the truck.
4. I loaded the truck with bricks.
5. I poured the water onto the ground.
6. *I poured the ground with water.
7. *I ﬁlled the bricks onto the truck.
8. I ﬁlled the truck with bricks.
The behavior of these verbs is not idiosyncratic; each of them is representative of a class
of semantically similar verbs that behave alike with respect to their participation in the two
locative constructions:
load: pile, cram, scatter...
pour: drip, slop, spill, slosh...
ﬁll: blanket, cover, ﬂood, clog, coat...
Thus, there are systematic relationships between the syntax and semantics of verbs. Errors
such as “ﬁll the salt into the bear” (Bowerman 1982) make it clear that it takes time for
the child to learn how verbs can be used. Exactly how the child exploits the correlations
between syntax and semantics in acquiring this knowledge has been the subject of
considerable controversy, however.
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which the child observes the consistencies across situational contexts in which a verb is
used to derive the verb’s meaning. Aspects of a situation that are not consistent across uses
of the verb would be expunged from a verb’s lexical entry. The verb pour, for instance,
would be observed in many contexts, including those in which a substance moves from a
container into another container (pouring water into a bucket or a glass) as well as those
in which a liquid moves from a container but not into another container (pouring water
onto the ground). Since the endpoint of the liquid’s motion is inconsistent across
situations, the child would expunge any concrete speciﬁcation of the endpoint of pouring
events from the lexical entry for pour. Innate “linking rules,” which specify the relation
between an argument’s place in a semantic representation and its place in a syntactic
representation, would then allow a verb’s syntactic privileges to be deduced directly from
the resulting lexical entry. What will be consistent about events described by pour in the
child’s environment will be a liquid that moves from a container by the force of gravity,
and this notion will form the basis of the word’s lexical entry. Since this description
includes an element (the liquid) that can be mapped to the innate notion “undergoer” or
“patient,” innate linking rules that map undergoers to grammatical direct object position
will tell the child that the direct object of pour will be the liquid that undergoes movement.
In this way, the child comes to know how to use pour (as pour and not as ﬁll) because of
what it means. This scenario assumes a probabilistic learning mechanism capable of
keeping track of the similarities across situations, allowing the child to deduce which
aspects of the local situation are relevant to the meaning of the verb, and relies on the
existence of innate linking rules to explain how the child knows how to use the verb once
its meaning is known.
Gleitman and her colleagues (e.g., Fisher, Gleitman, & Gleitman, 1991; Naigles,
Gleitman & Gleitman, 1993) have argued that this observational procedure is too weak.
Many verbs with opposite meanings can be used to describe the same situation, so paying
attention only to the situation in which a verb is used will not tell the child which argument
is subject and which object. For example, because every “chasing” event is also a
“ﬂeeing” event, the child has no way of knowing, from the situation alone, whether chase
means “chase” or “ﬂee.” With pouring events there may be only one element of the
situation that undergoes a change of location, and that will be the argument mapped onto
direct object position. With chase and ﬂee, however, there are two moving entities. Which
will be the patient and thus linked to direct object? It could be the chaser, if the child views
the event as one in which the fox is attempting to move to the location of the rabbit, or
it could be the chasee, in which case the rabbit is attempting to distance himself from the
fox.
Gleitman and colleagues’ syntactic bootstrapping theory is that the forms in which a
verb appears direct the child toward the correct meaning. Hearing a verb in a transitive
frame, the child utilizes the linking rule that maps undergoers to direct object positions in
reverse, such that the knowledge that an argument is the direct object tells the child that
the argument is a patient, and that the verb’s meaning is one that includes an undergoer
of the type expressed by the argument. Other constructions provide other aspects of
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describes an action on the part of the subject. Hearing a ditransitive or to dative
construction provides information that the verb contains the meaning of transfer. In other
words, the child learns what a verb means because of how it is used.
Criticism of Gleitman’s proposal has focused on the sufﬁciency of the syntactic
bootstrapping mechanism. Pinker (1994), for example, has observed there are many more
verbs than there are distinct syntactic contexts (subcategorization frames). Many aspects
of verb meaning are not associated with difference in syntactic structure. For example,
walking, strolling and sashaying differ semantically but behave the same way syntacti-
cally. This critique is based on a reading of Gleitman’s proposal in which the child’s use
of syntactic information to bootstrap meaning restricts the use of other available sources
of information, such as observation; however, the theory clearly does not limit the child
in this way. Rather, it holds that the conjunction of information provided by the syntactic
and discourse contexts in which verbs occur provides a basis for establishing their
meanings. As Naigles et al. observed,
We hold, with many others, that the information available from inspection of real-
world contingencies for verb use, taken alone, is too variable and degenerate to ﬁx the
construals. Therefore there must be an additional convergent source of evidence that
the child exploits in constructing a mental lexicon. One such potential source resides
in the structural privileges of occurrence for the meaningfully distinct verb items.
(p. 135).
Thus, the syntactic contexts in which a verb occurs constrain its meaning to a limited
range of alternatives that can then be further disambiguated by observational data
concerning the discourse context. In this way the use of syntactic information provides the
necessary basis for overcoming the limits of observational learning, rather than replacing
it in toto.
Similarly, Grimshaw (1990) has argued that because adjuncts cannot be distinguished
from arguments, using syntax to learn the semantics of verbs will be an unreliable
procedure. However, this kind of observation overlooks perhaps the central characteristic
of constraint satisfaction mechanisms, which is that they rely on conjunctions of multiple
sources of information that may be indeed be only partially constraining when taken in
isolation.
Our view is that the “bootstrapping” mechanisms that have ﬁgured centrally in
discussions of verb learning are components of a more general constraint satisfaction
processing system that exploits correlations between different sources of information
wherever they are found in the input. The view that lexical acquisition involves multiple
kinds of bootstrapping is gaining currency among child language researchers (e.g.,
Morgan, 1986; Jusczyk, 1997; Morgan & Demuth, 1996; Gillette et al., 1998; Mintz et al.,
1998) and there is as well a growing body of work that examines the extent to which
children are attending to and learning from various statistical and probabilistic aspects of
the input (see papers in Morgan & Demuth, e.g.). It is becoming quite clear that acquiring
multiple types of probabilistic linguistic information is not an impossible task for the
582 SEIDENBERG AND MACDONALDchild; rather, even very young infants are picking up considerable information concerning
distributional and sequential aspects of linguistic signals. The extent to which this type of
learning provides the basis for various aspects of linguistic structure is unknown, but the
similarity between these studies of learning and studies of adult processing is striking:
“Bootstrapping” in acquisition is “constraint satisfaction” in adult processing; the former
involves using correlations among different types of information to infer structure; the
latter involves using such correlations to comprehend sentences.
5
An illustration of the close theoretical linkage between the acquisition and adult
processing can be found in a connectionist model of verb acquisition developed by Allen
(1997). This model acquired verb semantics from the pairing of child-directed speech
taken from the CHILDES corpus, particularly verb argument structure information, and
information concerning the set of events accompanying the speech. For example, for the
transitive sentence Cathy broke the cup, the model received the argument structure
information that there were two arguments, one before the verb and one after, and that the
verb was break. This information was paired with the interpretation that there were two
participants, one the agent and one the patient, and that the event consisted of a breaking
event. The goal of the modeling effort was to use knowledge acquired from exposure to
these pairings to activate both appropriate argument role interpretations and the verb
semantics for each utterance, including constructions on which the model had not been
trained, such as the toy broke. Allen’s model performed well, exhibiting both the ability
to supply role interpretations for novel constructions and to activate appropriate verb
semantics for novel verbs when given information about both the argument structure and
the semantics of the noun arguments in the utterance. In other words, the model encodes
the partial regularities of the system and “bootstraps” from incomplete data, enabling it to
generalize to novel instances.
Allen showed that the model took advantage of a great deal of distributional informa-
tion in the input to acquire its verb representations. This information included, in
approximately descending order of importance, the frequency with which a verb was used,
the set of constructions the verb appeared in, the frequency with which a verb was used
in particular constructions, the semantic relation between a verb and other verbs used in
similar constructions, the combined frequencies of related verbs, and the size of the set of
semantically related verbs. These factors combined to form neighborhoods of verbs with
semantically mediated privileges of co-occurrence. Allen’s model therefore does not
simply use syntactic information to acquire semantic information or information from the
world to acquire syntactic information; rather, it simultaneously performs syntactic and
semantic bootstrapping, using soft constraints from multiple sources to converge on
syntactic and semantic representations of verbs. Moreover, though this process might be
termed “bootstrapping” in the acquisition literature, it is equally an example of constraint-
based language processing; the distributional information that the model acquired looks
very similar to the constraints that are used in adult performance (MacDonald, 1999). This
relationship is not accidental, because the task of the model was not acquisition per se but
rather a simpliﬁed version of what human adult comprehenders do, namely assign a
583 PROBABILISTIC CONSTRAINTS IN ACQUISITION AND PROCESSINGrepresentation to each input sentence. In the course of assigning these representations,
Allen’s model passes activation across various levels of representation, and each utterance
affects the weights between connections in the network. In this system, encoding of
distributional information does not stem from some specialized acquisition mechanism but
is rather an inevitable consequence of this kind of processing architecture when applied to
the task of comprehension or production.
In summary, the characteristic of the adult system we take to be crucial is the rapid
integration of multiple probabilistic constraints involving different types of information.
This aspect of processing has been explored extensively in studies of syntactic ambiguity
resolution and other aspects of “on-line” processing. The acquisition problem is how the
child acquires this system. Speciﬁc issues that need to be addressed include how structures
(“levels of linguistic representation”) emerge in the course of acquisition; the properties
of these representations, which may deviate from classical accounts; and which kinds of
statistical information are acquired from experience.
We have described one area, verbs and their argument structures, in which this
approach has been explored in some detail. Related work includes studies of the word
segmentation problem (i.e., how children identify spoken words in continuous speech;
Aslin et al., 1996; Christiansen et al., 1998) and how children identify the grammatical
categories of words (Kelly, 1992; Mintz et al., 1998; Redington et al., 1998). All of these
problems share important characteristics. In each case, researchers have identiﬁed a
variety of sources of information in the input that might contribute to solving the problem.
Using these cues to linguistic structure raises classic learnability questions: How does the
child know which cues are the relevant ones? The cues are probabilistic rather than
absolute; if a cue is not entirely reliable, how could it be useful? Moreover, what beneﬁt
could arise from combining several unreliable cues?
Answers to these questions are provided by coupling these observations about proba-
bilistic cues with computational mechanisms that explain how cues can be identiﬁed and
combined. Connectionist networks provide a useful tool in this regard. A network that is
assigned a task such as identifying the boundaries between words acts as a discovery
procedure: it will make use of whatever information in the input facilitates mastering the
task This property is simply a consequence of using a learning algorithm that minimizes
a cost function. From our perspective, the question “how does the child know which
statistics to compute” is ill-formed. Certain information will be acquired given the nature
of the architecture, the learning rule, and the input data. We can attempt to quantify this
information statistically but the best characterization of what the child knows will be
provided by examining the behavior of a network that simulates the child’s behavior in
appropriate detail. Examining the behavior of such networks also provides insights about
the cue reliability question. These networks are not restricted to using a single type of
information in solving a problem; their power derives from the capacity to combine
multiple probabilistic cues efﬁciently. Individual cues that are not highly informative
when taken in isolation may be highly constraining when taken in conjunction with each
other.
584 SEIDENBERG AND MACDONALDV. PROSPECTS
People from the generative tradition often assume that the goal of this work is to show that
language is not innate; thus it represents a return to a form of empiricism that most
linguists thought was conclusively refuted years ago (see, e.g., Pinker, 1991; Wexler,
1991). Our assumption is that modern cognitive neuroscience and developmental neuro-
biology provide alternatives to both the Chomskian version of nativism and tabula rasa
empiricism. It seems obvious that children are born with capacities to think, perceive, and
learn that allow them to acquire language whereas chimpanzees do not. However, the
hypothesis that children are born with knowledge of Universal Grammar may not be the
only way to explain the facts about acquisition. At this point we do not have conﬁdence
in the validity of various arguments in support of innate Universal Grammar, but this does
not mean the hypothesis is necessarily wrong. Our assumption is that we cannot validly
infer what is innate without thoroughly investigating what can be learned. It is already
clear that much more can be learned on the basis of the input available to the child, using
simple and general learning mechanisms, than the generative approach assumes. How far
these mechanisms take the child toward the adult steady-state is not known but needs to
be investigated thoroughly.
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NOTES
1. This article provides a brief overview of a theoretical framework that has emerged out of the work of many
people. Space limitations preclude a comprehensive review of the literature; see MacWhinney (1998);
Chater and Christiansen (1999); and Christiansen and Chater (this issue). We have attempted to develop an
integrated framework that, while not sui generis, casts the issues in a particular way, one that derives in
large part from considering language acquisition from the perspective provided by what is known about
adult performance.
2. To this list we would now add “what is the neurobiological basis of language” and “how did language
evolve in the species.”
3. Allen and Seidenberg discuss why this result obtained. In brief, the crucial fact is that although the words
in a sentence like “Colorless” have very low transition probabilities, they contain familiar sequences of
semantic types such as ,property property thing action manner.. At this level they are comparable to
grammatical sentences with higher word transition probabilities. In contrast, ungrammatical sentences such
as “Ideas colorless sleep furiously green” do not contain such sequences (thus, ,thing property action
manner property. does not occur in the language). The model was sensitive to both types of sequential
information and therefore treated grammatical and ungrammatical sentences differently.
4. For early statements of this general idea see Marslen–Wilson and Welsh (1978) and Rumelhart (1977).
5. Pinker (1987) discussed bootstrapping mechanisms in language acquisition in terms of constraint satisfac-
tion principles drawn from artiﬁcial intelligence. This is a symbolic notion of constraint satisfaction
somewhat different than the one discussed here (see Macworth, 1977). However, Pinker’s description of the
verb learning problem as one involving multiple simultaneous constraints was rather accurate. He closed his
article by noting that connectionist models were said to be able to efﬁciently compute complex interactions
among constraints but that a connectionist researcher had told him that this was a difﬁcult problem.
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